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Orders of Criticality in Voting Games
Abstract
In this paper we focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of
players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coali-
tions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this
purpose, we extend the classical notion of criticality of players in order to character-
ize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition
thanks to the collusion with other players.
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1 Introduction
We consider a Parliament that produced a majority coalition. If the majority corresponds
to a minimal winning coalition all the parties result critical, i.e. each of them is able to
destroy the majority when leaving, but we may face also a different situation in which
not all the parties are critical, i.e. the majority corresponds to a quasi-minimal winning
coalition. A similar situation was typical in the Eighties when the Italian governments
included five parties, namely Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana - DC), Italian
Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano - PSI), Italian Social-Demoratic Party (Partito
Socialista Democratico Italiano - PSDI), Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano
Italiano - PRI), Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano - PLI); for some years only
DC was critical (in the last years also PSI became critical), but all the parties received
ministries and/or departments and in 1981 the premiership of the government was given
to Giovanni Spadolini, the leader of PRI.
At a first glance, the situation may seem unusual because all the parties received a
quota of the power even if the non-critical parties should receive nothing. On the other
hand, it is possible to notice that the number of seats of the parties allowed for a minimal
winning coalition after the leaving of a non-critical party, generating a situation that
reduced the importance of critical parties. For instance, in case of a minimal winning
coalition of four parties each of them is critical and should receive a quarter of the power;
but if the majority includes five parties and only one is critical it may leave a small amount
of power to the four non-critical parties getting much more than one quarter of the power.
This could be a way to justify the power assigned to the parties, i.e. compensate them
in order that they do not leave the majority. This situation was considered, under a
different viewpoint in Chessa and Fragnelli (2014); they accounted for the possibility of
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the parties of forming a different majority coalition that excludes another party, which
in its turn may propose another majority coalition that does not include the party that
started the process. In this way, the hypotheses on which the bargaining set (see Aumann
and Maschler, 1964) relies are satisfied, so the elements in the bargaining set are suitable
for measuring the power of the parties.
In the present Italian political situation, we may consider the group Alleanza Liberal-
popolare-Autonomie (ALA) that is represented only in the Senate, where the majority
supporting the Italian government is very unstable, differently from the Lower Chamber,
Camera dei Deputati, where the majority is stable. The ALA group had in mind to
support the approval of some reforms proposed by the government, acting as a critical
party, but the presence of this group had the consequence that other members of the
majority, the minority of the Democratic Party, decided to support the reforms in order
to avoid the criticality of the ALA group.
We can say that the critical parties have a first order of criticality, while the non-
critical ones have a higher order of criticality.
The aim of this paper is to provide a formal definition of the second order critical
players, which may be extended to further orders, and analyze some properties, proposing
an allocation of the power.
The paper is organized as follows. We start recalling in Section 2 some notations
and general definitions; Section 3 deals with higher orders of criticality, where a player i
becomes critical for a coalitionM only if other players (not critical for the same coalition)
leave M before i; in Section 4 we strengthen the notion of criticality of a player i to a
coalition M adding the further constraint that the threaten of i to leave M is made
“credible” only if i has another opportunity to form a winning coalition with players out
of M ; Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where N =
{1, 2, ..., n} denotes the finite set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function,
with v(∅) = 0. v(S) is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N , i.e. what players in S may obtain
standing alone.
A TU-game (N, v) is simple when v : 2N → {0, 1}, with S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T )5 and
v(N) = 1. If v(S) = 0 then S is a losing coalition, while if v(S) = 1 then S is a winning
coalition. Given a winning coalition S, if S \ {i} is losing then i ∈ N is a critical player
for S. When a coalition S contains at least one critical player for it, S is a quasi-minimal
winning coalition; when all the players of S are critical, it is a minimal winning coalition.
A simple game may be defined also assigning the set of winning coalitions or the set of
minimal winning coalitions.
A particular class of simple games is represented by the weighted majority games. A
vector of weights (w1, w2, ..., wn) is associated to the players that leads to the following
definition of the characteristic function of the corresponding weighted majority game
(N,w):
w(S) =
{
1 if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q
0 otherwise
, S ⊆ N,
5 This property is called monotonicity.
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where q is the majority quota. A weighted majority situation is often denoted as [q;w1, w2,
..., wn]. Usually, we ask that the game is proper or N-proper, i.e. if S is winning then
N \ S is losing; for this aim it is sufficient to choose q > 1
2
∑
i∈N wi. Note that a simple
game may not correspond to any weighted majority situation.
Given a TU-game (N, v), an allocation is a n-dimensional vector (xi)i∈N ∈ R
N assign-
ing to player i ∈ N the amount xi; an allocation (xi)i∈N is efficient if x(N) =
∑
i∈N xi =
v(N). A solution is a function ψ that assigns an allocation ψ(v) to every TU-game (N, v)
belonging to a given class of games G with player set N .
For simple games, and in particular for weighted majority games, a solution is often
called a power index, as each component xi may be interpreted as the percentage of power
assigned to player i ∈ N . In the literature, several power indices were introduced; among
others, we recall the following definitions.
The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954), φ, is the natural version for
simple games of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). It is defined as the average of the
marginal contributions of player i w.r.t. all the possible orderings and it can be written
as:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
mi(S), i ∈ N,
where n and s denote the cardinalities of the set of players N and of the coalition S,
respectively and mi(S) = v(S) − v(S \ {i}) denotes the marginal contribution of player
i ∈ N to coalition S ⊆ N, S 3 i.
The normalized Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965), β, is similar to the Shapley-Shubik
index, but it considers the marginal contributions of a player to all possible coalitions,
independently from the order of the players; first, we define:
β∗i (v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N,S3i
mi(S), i ∈ N ;
then, by normalization we get:
βi(v) =
β∗i (v)∑
j∈N β
∗
j (v)
, i ∈ N.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be a vector of n non-negative numbers such that
∑n
k=1 pk
(
n
k
)
= 1
with the interpretation that ps is the probability that a coalition of size s forms. We
denote by pip the semivalue (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 1981) engendered by the vector
p. Hence,
pipi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
psmi(S). (1)
Notice that both the Shapley-Shubik index φ and the Banzhaf index β∗ can be defined as
particular semivalues pip
φ
and pip
β
, respectively, where the probability vector pφ is such
that pφs =
(s−1)!(n−s)!
n!
and pβ is such that pβs =
1
2n−1
. Notice that for a (monotonic) simple
game v relation (1) can be simply written as
pipi (v) =
∑
S∈Wi(v)
psmi(S), (2)
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where Wi(v) is the set of winning coalitions containing player i ∈ N . Moreover, the value
mi(S) = 1 only if i is critical for S in v, for each S ∈ Wi(v). Consequently, the value
pipi (v) can be interpreted as the probability of player i to play a critical role in v. Every
semivalue pip satisfies the symmetry property (i.e., pipi (v) = pi
p
j (v) for each game v and
every pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N , i.e. such that v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all
S ⊆ N \ {i, j})) and the null player property (i.e., pipi (v) = 0 for each game v and every
null player i ∈ N , i.e. such that v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N).
In the following, we mainly refer to the Banzhaf index because it is more probability-
oriented, as it does not account the ordering in which the players enter a coalition, which
is usual in majority coalitions.
3 Second and Higher Orders of Criticality
In this section, we introduce the formal definition of order of criticality for a player. Given
a winning coalition M ⊆ N , a critical player i ∈ M may be called critical of the first
order for coalition M . Now we deal with the other players in M .
Definition 1 Let M ⊆ N , with |M | ≥ 3, be a winning coalition; let i ∈ M be a player
s.t. v(M \ {i}) = 1. We say that player i is Critical Of the Second Order (COSO) for
coalition M , via player j ∈M \ {i} iff v(M \ {i, j}) = 0 with v(M \ {j}) = 1.
The interpretation is the following: player i is not critical for M , but there exists in M
another player j, different from i, s.t. M becomes a losing coalition when both the players
leave. From the definition, we immediately get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If player i ∈M is critical of the second order for coalition M , via player
j ∈M , then player j is critical of the second order for coalition M , via player i.
The result is a straightforward consequence of the definition, and does not require a proof.
Remark 1 Note that when there are critical players of the second order, they are at least
two, but they can be also more as in the following example.
Example 1 Consider the weighted majority situation [51; 40, 8, 5, 5, 5]; the first party
is the unique critical one, while the other four parties are critical of the second order, even
if the last three parties are critical only via the second party.
Definition 1 can be extended to further orders as follows.
Definition 2 Let k ≥ 2 be an integer, let M ⊆ N , with |M | ≥ k + 2, be a winning
coalition; let i ∈M be a player s.t. v(M \ {i}) = 1. We say that player i is critical of the
order k + 1 for coalition M , via coalition K ⊆ M \ {i}, with |K| = k iff
v(M \K)− v(M \ (K ∪ {i})) = 1, (3)
and K is the set of minimal cardinality satisfying (3), i.e.
v(M \ (T ∪ {i})) = 1, (4)
for any T ⊂ K with |T | < k.
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The interpretation is similar to the previous one: Player i is not critical for M , but there
exists in M a coalition K, not including i, s.t. M becomes losing when all the players in
K ∪ {i} leave.
It should also be noticed that the notion of minimal cardinality is crucial to unam-
biguously assign the order of criticality of a player in a coalition.
Example 2 Consider the weighted majority situation [31; 21,5,3,3,3,3,2]; player 7 be-
comes critical whenever either a coalition involving player 2 and any of the players 3-6
are involved (they are the coalition K in the definition), or three of the players 3-6 are
involved. According to Definition 2, player 7 is critical of the third order.
Notice also that the above definition encompasses the definitions for lower orders. In
particular, we obtain first order criticality when (3) is satisfied by K = ∅ of 0-cardinality,
leading to v(M) − v(M \ {i}) = 1. For second order criticality consider K = {j}, then,
by (3), v(M \ {j}) = 1 and v(M \ {i, j}) = 0. Moreover, since {j} is the set of minimal
cardinality which makes i critical, then v(M \ {i}) = 1.
We can derive a more general result than Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 If player i ∈M is critical of the order k+1 for coalition M , via coalition
K ⊂M , then each player j ∈ K is critical of the order k+1 for coalition M , via coalition
K ∪ {i} \ {j}.
Proof Define K ′ = K \ {j}. Since i is critical for M via coalition K = K ′ ∪ {j}, then
v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {j}))− v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {i, j})) = 1 . (5)
We want to show that j is critical for M via K ′ ∪ {i}. Now v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {i, j})) = 0 by
(5), and, since |K ′| < k, v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {i})) = 1 by (4). Therefore
v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {i}))− v(M \ (K ′ ∪ {i, j})) = 1 .
We need to verify the minimality of K ′ ∪ {i}. Consider T ⊂ K ′ ∪ {i}. There are two
cases: (a) i ∈ T , then
v(M \ (T ∪ {j})) = v(M \ [T ∪ {j} \ {i}] ∪ {i}) = 1 ,
since |T ∪{j}\{i}| < k. (b) i /∈ T , then T ∪{j} ⊂ K and v(M \(T ∪{j})) ≥ v(M \K) = 1
and equation (4) is always satisfied.
Remark 2 A null player is never critical.
Remark 3 Note that when there are critical players of order k+1, they are at least k+1,
but they can be also more as in the following example.
Example 3 Consider the weighted majority situation [51; 44, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3]; in this
case the first one is the unique critical party, while the other six parties are critical of the
fourth order; note that there are no parties critical of order 2 or 3.
In view of Propositions 1 and 2 and Remark 2 we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 LetM ⊆ N be a winning coalition, then the players inM may be partitioned
into those who are critical of some order and those who are never critical.
Proposition 3 Let i ∈ M be a player critical of the order k + 1 for coalition M , via
coalition K ⊂ M ; if a player j ∈ K leaves the coalition, then i is a player critical of the
order k for coalition M \ {j}, via coalition K \ {j}.
Proof It is sufficient to note that M \ (K ∪ {i}) = (M \ {j}) \ ((K \ {j}) ∪ {i}) so both
of them are losing and |K \ {j}| = |K| − 1.
After defining the various orders of criticality, we want to provide an index to measure
how much a player may profit from being critical. The first step is to measure the power
of a player w.r.t. a given coalition, accounting also his order; then we may aggregate the
power of a player w.r.t. all coalitions he may belong to.
We want now to compute the probability for a player i ∈ N to be COSO in v for
some coalitions via another player j ∈ N . First, consider a coalition S ∈ 2N\{i,j} with
v(S ∪ {i, j}) = 1 and define Cij(S) as follows:
Cij(S) = min{v(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})} − v(S).
By monotonicity of v we have four possible cases as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Possible cases for player i (j) to be COSO for coalition S ∪ {i, j} via player j
(i).
v(S ∪ {i}) v(S ∪ {j}) v(S) Cij(S)
1) 0 1 0 0
2) 1 0 0 0
3) 1 1 1 0
4) 1 1 0 1
The only case in which i is COSO for S∪{i, j} via j is the last one (4) and Cij(S) = 1.
Note also that, in general, Cij(S) = Cji(S).
Let p = (p0, . . . , pn−1) be a probability vector as defined in Section 2. If we want to
compute the probability that i is COSO for some coalitions via j, we should compute the
following expression:
Γpij(v) =
∑
S∈2N\{i,j}
ps+1Cij(S).
By Proposition 1, it immediately follows that Γpij(v) = Γ
p
ji(v) for each i, j ∈ N .
Following the same approach used to define semivalues (see relation (1)), we can also
compute the total probability that a player i is COSO for some coalition via some other
player as the following summation:
Cpi (v) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
Γpij(v).
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Now, consider the game (N, vij) such that for each S ∈ 2N\{i,j}:
vij(S ∪ {i, j}) = vij(S ∪ {i}) = vij(S ∪ {j}) = min{v(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})}
and
vij(S) = v(S).
The game (N, vij) represents a coalitional situation where the role of i (resp. j) is nega-
tively influenced by j (resp. i), that is the value of each coalition M containing either i
or j is lowered to the worst value between v(M ∪ {j} \ {i}) and v(M ∪ {i} \ {j}).
It is easy to check that Γpij(v) = pi
p
i (v
ij).
Example 4 Consider the simple game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} whose minimal win-
ning coalitions are {1, 2, 3} and {1, 2, 4}. Note that 3 (resp. 4) is COSO for {1, 2, 3, 4}
via 4 (resp. 3), and no other player is COSO via another player for some coalition.
Taking the vector pβ as the probability vector yielding the Banzhaf index pip
β
(see Sec-
tion 2), we have that Γp
β
34 (v) = Γ
p
β
43 (v) =
1
8
and Γp
β
ij (v) = 0 for all the other i and j in
N with {i, j} 6= {3, 4}. We have that v34(S) = v43(S) = v(S) for each S ∈ 2N . So,
Γp
β
34 (v) = Γ
p
β
43 (v) = pi
p
β
3 (v
34) = pip
β
4 (v
43) = 1
8
. In addition, we also have that vij(S) = 0
for each S ∈ 2N and for all i and j with {i, j} 6= {3, 4}; so, Γp
β
ij (v) = pi
p
β
i (v
ij) = 0 for all
i and j with {i, j} 6= {3, 4}.
In this example, the total probability to be COSO is Cp
β
1 (v) = C
p
β
2 (v) = 0 and C
p
β
3 (v) =
Cp
β
4 (v) =
1
8
.
Now, consider a game (N, v) and take a coalitionM such that i ∈M and K ⊆M \{i}
with |K| = k , k ≥ 2. Similarly as above, we can compute the value
CiK(M) = min{v(M \ T ) : T ⊂ K ∪ {i}} − v(M \ (K ∪ {i})).
that is equal to 1 iff i is critical of order k + 1 for coalition M via coalition K ⊂ M .
Consequently, if we want to compute the probability that i is critical of order k + 1 for
some coalitions via coalition K, we should compute the following expression:
ΓpiK(v) =
∑
S∈2N\{i} with k⊆M
psCij(S).
Once again, note that Γpij,k(v) = Γ
p
ji,k(v).
We conclude this section with an example of possible application of the notions of
criticality of first and second order to the analysis of the power of political parties in a
realistic scenario.
Example 5 Consider the political situation described in Section 1 and concerning the
Italian Senate during the Eighties. More precisely, the distribution of seats among the
political parties of the largest alliance in the Italian Senate during the IX Legislature
(1979-1983) was the one shown in Table 2.
At that time, the quota needed to have a majority within the Senate was 162. This leads
to the weighted majority situation [162; 145, 32, 9, 6, 2] on the player set {DC,PSI, PSDI,
PRI, PLI}. Notice that a coalition is a winning one if it contains one of the following
minimal winning coalitions {{DC,PSI}, {DC,PSDI, PRI, PLI}}. The symmetric rela-
tion of COSO exists between several pairs of players and for coalition {DC,PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI},
specifically: PSI vs. PSDI, PSI vs. PRI and PSI vs. PLI.
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Table 2: The distribution of seats in the largest alliance in the Italian Senate during the
IX Legislature (1979-1983).
Party seats
Democrazia Cristiana (DC) 145
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) 32
Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano (PSDI) 9
Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI) 6
Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) 2
Using the probability vector pβ, we can compute the probability to be critical of the
first order (i.e., the Banzhaf index ) and to be COSO (using the index Cp
β
), as shown in
Table 3.
Table 3: The Banzhaf index and the total probability to be COSO in the Italian Senate.
Party pip
β
Cp
β
DC 9
16
0
PSI 7
16
3
16
PSDI 1
16
1
16
PRI 1
16
1
16
PLI 1
16
1
16
For the sake of completeness, we recall that in 1983 the PSI threatened to leave the five-
parties alliance unless Bettino Craxi, the PSI party’s leader, was made Prime Minister.
The DC party accepted this compromise in order to avoid a new election. Maybe, the DC
party had evaluated the threaten of the PSI as likely in view of the high index Cp
β
for the
PSI party.
4 Credible criticality
We now consider an alternative notion of criticality of the first order where the fact that
i can threaten coalitionM in a credible way is made possible by the fact that there exists
another opportunity for i to be winning without the help of players in M . We want to
remark that this hypothesis is different from that in Chessa and Fragnelli (2013) where i
could ask for the help of some players in M , but not all.
Definition 3 Let M ⊆ N with v(M) = 1. A player i ∈ M is said credibly critical
or credibly critical of the first order for coalition M iff it satisfies the following two
conditions: (c.1) i is critical for M (i.e. v(M \ {i}) = 0) and (c.2) there exists another
coalition S ⊆ N \M that is winning together with i, i.e. v(S ∪ {i}) = 1.
Example 6 Consider the simple game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3} whose minimal winning
coalitions are {1, 2} and {2, 3}. Player 2 is credibly critical for coalition {1, 2} (in fact
v(1, 2) = 1, v(1) = 0 and v(2, 3) = 1), but players 1 and 3 are never credibly critical.
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The property of credible criticality of a player i ∈ N for a coalition M ⊆ N \ {i}
can affect the ability of player i to gain power over a winning coalition M ∪ {i} by
defeating the resistance of the other members in M to assign the marginal contribution
v(M ∪ {i})− v(M) to i.
More in general, we can think of a situation where the marginal contribution v(M ∪
{i})−v(M) is assigned to player i only if i could potentially take part in another coalition
S ⊆ N \M at least as powerful as M ∪ {i} and with M ∩ S = ∅. For a simple game,
this consideration leads us to the following definition of credible marginal contribution of
a player i to a coalition M ⊆ N \ {i}:
mˆvi (M) =
{
v(M ∪ {i})− v(M) if v(N \M) = 1,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Remark 4 A credible marginal contribution exists and can be computed for each player i
and each coalition M ⊆ N \ {i} on each possible game (N, v). However, in the remaining
of the paper we will focus on the computation of the quantity mˆvi (M) for simple games.
Remark 5 A more compact way to define the quantity mˆvi (S) for each i ∈ N and M ∈
2N\{i} is as follows:
mˆvi (M) = min{v(M ∪ {i})− v(M), v(N \M)}. (7)
Now, consider again a probability vector p = (p0, . . . , pn−1) as in the previous section.
As a measure of the power that players may credibly claim in a simple game, we define
the following credible semivalue engendered by the vector p. Hence,
pˆipi (v) =
∑
S∈2N\{i}
psmˆ
v
i (S) =
∑
S∈Wi(v)
psmˆ
v
i (S). (8)
For simple games, pˆipi (v) can be interpreted as the probability of player i to be credibly
critical (under the probability vector p). The next examples show that the vector of
indices provided by a semivalue pip engendered by a probability vector p can be drastically
different from the one provided by the credible semivalue pˆip engendered by the same
probability vector.
Example 7 Consider the simple game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3} whose unique minimal
winning coalitions is {1, 2}. By the null player property, whatever semivalue pip yields
pip3 (v) = 0 and, by symmetry, pi
p
1 (v) = pi
p
2 (v). Notice also that no player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
credibly critical. So, each credible semivalue yields pˆipi (v) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The next example shows that not only the values pip and pˆip can be very different, but
even the ranking of players according to pip and pˆip need not be preserved.
Example 8 Consider the simple game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} whose minimal
winning coalitions are {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5} and {3, 4, 5}. Consider the semivalue
pip
β
corresponding to the Banzhaf value. Then, the Banzhaf value gives pip
β
1 = pi
p
β
2 =
6
16
and pip
β
3 = pi
p
β
4 = pi
p
β
5 =
4
16
. Now consider the notion of credibly criticality. Note that 1
and 2 are never credibly critical, whereas 3, 4 and 5 are credibly critical whenever they
are critical. Consequently, pˆip
β
1 = pˆi
p
β
2 = 0 and pˆi
p
β
3 = pˆi
p
β
4 = pˆi
p
β
5 =
4
16
.
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Proposition 4 A credible semivalue pˆip satisfies the null player property and the sym-
metry property.
Proof Both properties follow from the definition of credible marginal contribution as for
the case of classical semivalues.
Proposition 5 Consider a weighted majority game (N, v) with quota and weights [q;w1,
. . . , wn]. Let pˆi
p defined according to relation (8) on any probability vector p. Then,
wi ≥ wj ⇒ pˆi
p
i ≥ pˆi
p
j ,
for each i, j ∈ N
Proof Let i, j ∈ N with wi ≥ wj and S ∈ 2
N\{i,j}. Then, by definition of weighted
majority game, v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}). So, by relation (7), it immediately follows that
mˆvi (S) = min{v(S ∪ {i})− v(S), v(N \ S)} ≥
min{v(S ∪ {j})− v(S), v(N \ S)} = mˆvj (S).
(9)
Now take S ∈ 2N\{i,j} and consider the credible marginal contribution mˆvi (S ∪ {j}) and
mˆvj (S ∪ {i}). Then, v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}). Again by relation (7) it follows that
mˆvi (S ∪ {j}) = min{v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j}), v(N \ (S ∪ {j}))} ≥
min{v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {i}), v(N \ (S ∪ {i}))} = mˆvj (S ∪ {i}),
(10)
where the inequality follows from the fact that by definition of the weighted majority game,
v(S∪{i, j})−v(S∪{j})≥ v(S∪{i, j})−v(S∪{i}), and v(N \(S∪{j})) ≥ v(N \(S∪{i})),
since N \ (S ∪ {j}) is obtained by substituting j with i in N \ (S ∪ {i}).
The proof follows by relations (9) and (10) and the fact that by relation (8)
pˆipi (v) =
∑
S∈2N\{i,j}
(mˆvi (S) + mˆ
v
i (S ∪ {j})) ,
for each i ∈ N .
The converse of Proposition 5 is not true, as shown by Example 7, where the game
(N, v) can be generated by the weighted majority situation [3; 2, 2, 0] and pˆip(v) = (0, 0, 0)
for any credible semivalue pˆip.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduced the concept of order of criticality for a party in a winning
coalition, based on the minimal number of other parties that are necessary for making
the coalition losing. Then, we defined a measure of the criticality that allows fixing the
relevance of a party in a majority coalition; this measure accounts for the probability that
a party is critical of a given order. Finally, we studied the credibility of a threat of a
party considering the possibility of forming an alternative majority joining to some of the
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parties in the opposition. Possible developments of the credibility may account for the
effectiveness of the possible alternative majorities. For instance, it is possible to take into
account the ideological contiguity of the parties on a left-right axis (see Fragnelli et al,
2009) or the previous majorities that were formed in the past.
Another possible direction of investigation may be the analysis of credible criticality
of higher orders; in this case, when player i ∈ N is critical of second (or higher) order
for a winning coalition M 3 i, we cannot use the same approach as for criticality of the
first order because this implies that the game is not proper as the two disjoint coalitions
M \ {i} and (N \M) ∪ {i} are winning. Consequently, the definition should allow to
include in the alternative majority some players in M \ {i}.
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